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Abstract
This paper studies strategies pursued by banks in order to diﬀerentiate
their services from those of their rivals. In that way competition among banks
is softened. More specifically we analyze if the bank size, the bank’s ability
to avoid losses, and its capital ratio can be used as strategic variables to
make banks diﬀerent and increase the interest rates banks can charge their
borrowers in equilibrium. Using a panel of data covering Norwegian banks
between 1993 and 1998 we find empirical support that the ability to avoid
losses, measured by the ratio of loss provisions, may act as such a strategic
variable. Our main finding is that borrowers in the market for credit line loans
may discipline banks to avoid losses. We also find evidence that banks pass on
parts of increases in their operating costs to credit line borrowers. However,
we do not find evidence for the use of high capital ratio as a strategic variable
that borrowers are willing to pay for.
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1. Introduction
There exists a vast literature investigating the nature of competition in markets
with diﬀerentiated products. In this paper we focus on endogenous diﬀerentiation
among banks. More precisely, how banks strategically choose diﬀerent “quality”
characteristics (equity ratios, loss avoidance, size etc.) in order to diﬀerentiate
themselves from competing banks, and thereby soften competition. This focus en-
ables the analysis of why banks become diﬀerent and not why diﬀerent borrowers
choose diﬀerent contracts, which is extensively analyzed in the literature.
The fact that borrowers are diﬀerent opens up an opportunity for banks to diﬀer-
entiate their quality characteristics (provide diﬀerent services and levels of quality)
in order to soften competition.
For instance, some borrowers face large lock-in eﬀects due to the fact that their
current bank has an informational advantage compared to competing banks (see
Sharpe (1990)). These borrowers are inclined to choose banks that they anticipate
are able to extend credit lines or provide new loans in future periods (switching to
another bank is costly). This suggests that bank characteristics that are informative
about a bank’s ability to provide loans in the future is important for the borrowers.
We explore two such variables; bank solvency and diversification, the latter repre-
sented by bank size. Well diversified and well capitalized banks will less likely face
large losses and are more able to withstand potential losses. Locked-in borrowers
may prefer such banks (see Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)).1
Signalling is an important characteristic which can be used to alleviate asym-
metric information and to contribute to a borrower’s value (see for instance Billett,
Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995)). By borrowing from a high quality bank a borrow-
ing firm can signal its creditworthiness to its other stake holders. Thus, banks can
segment the markets according to borrowers’ willingness to pay for borrowing from
banks known to have a high quality loan portfolio (i.e. low loan-loss provisions), and
extract higher rents from those valuing such a characteristic.
If borrowers are willing to pay extra for borrowing from banks with low loan-loss
provisions or high capital ratio, banks face a market discipline eﬀect diﬀerent from
1Peek and Rosengren (1997) provide empirical evidence for a negative relation between loan
losses at banks and their concurrent supply of loans.
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the ones in the deposit and money markets, which have been previously studied
in the banking literature.2 A possible disciplinary eﬀect in the credit market may
reinforce the market disciplinary eﬀect in the deposit and money markets and make
banks less financially fragile.
The aforementioned examples of quality characteristics illustrate that theory
alone cannot provide a definite answer as to what characteristics borrowers are
willing pay for; this is an empirical issue, which we explore in this paper.
The majority of the literature dealing with debt structure analyzes the decision
made by firms of whether to utilize arm’s length (publicly traded) versus bank debt.
A comprehensive review of the issue is given in Boot (2000). An interesting recent
paper by Cantillo and Wright (2000) investigates the characteristics determining
which companies finance themselves through intermediaries and which borrow di-
rectly from arm’s length investors. In the present paper however, we focus on and
restrict our attention to debt taken from the banking sector only, and analyze why
and how banks choose diﬀerent characteristics to diﬀerentiate themselves in order
to soften competition. This is because most European countries have relatively thin
markets for arm’s length debt (bonds and certificates). OECD statistics show that
bond and certificates as of 1995 comprised only around 4.0%-6.0% of total funding
for the private non-financial firms in Europe (see OECD (1996)).
Before conducting the empirical analysis, we provide a stylized, two-stage, the-
oretical model which can shed some light on ways banks can utilize borrower-
heterogeneity in order to diﬀerentiate themselves. In the empirical part, we use
data from the Norwegian banking industry to illustrate along which dimensions
banks may find it most profitable to diﬀerentiate and soften competition.
The paper is organized in the following way: section 2 presents the theoretical
model; section 3 describes the data used, variables calculations, and the empiri-
cal model. Empirical results and discussion are presented in section 4. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2See for instance Calomiris and Kahn (1991) for a theoretical model explaining how depositors
can discipline bank managers. Rochet and Tirole (1996) provide a theory of peer monitoring among
banks in the interbank market. Both in Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) and in Gunther,
Hooks, and J.Robinson (2000) there is emprical evidence of depositors disciplining banks’ risk
taking.
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2. A theoretical model
A two-stage model is introduced to illustrate how banks can diﬀerentiate their ser-
vices in order to attract borrowers with diﬀerent financial needs. In general, banks
can pursue two kinds of diﬀerentiation strategies. A bank can diﬀer from the other
banks in a way that all borrowers consider as better than its competitors (e.g. bet-
ter services). In the literature this kind of diﬀerentiation is denoted vertical product
diﬀerentiation, and this is the kind of product diﬀerentiation we consider here. In
contrast, horizontal product diﬀerentiation does not imply that all borrowers agree
about whether or not a bank oﬀers better services than its competitors. For exam-
ple, a bank may move a branch from city A to city B, to the benefit of customers
in the latter city.
In the theoretical model we are deliberately vague about exactly which strategic
variable banks use in their vertical product diﬀerentiation strategy. In the empir-
ical part we analyze diﬀerent potential “quality” variables that banks can use to
diﬀerentiate.
For simplicity, we study the case with two banks, bank A and bank B. At stage
1, the banks choose their quality variables, qi, i = A,B and, at stage 2, the banks
choose interest rates, ri, i = A,B (Bertrand competition). This two-stage structure
captures the notion that some characteristics are used as strategic variables, i.e.
variables more costly or diﬃcult to alter than interest rates. Figure 1 presents a
schematic diagram of the two-stage game:
Stage 1
Banks choose quality variables, qA and qB, simultaneously.
Stage 2
Banks choose interest rates, rA and rB, simultaneously.
Borrowers accept an oﬀer from one of the banks.
Figure 1: Competition in a two-stage game
There are numerous potential ways a bank can distinguish itself from its com-
petitors. If bank relationships are important, borrowers may be concerned about the
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capabilities or characteristics of their main bank. Let us here briefly point out some
potential quality variables in banking. Which quality variables that are important
is an empirical question examined in the following empirical part of the paper.
• Monitoring/screening: Some banks may be well-known for having high-quality
staﬀ that is experienced evaluators of investment projects. A low level of losses
on loans may indicate high monitoring/screening capabilities. A borrower that
faces switching costs may favor such a bank since it increases the probability
of correct evaluation of future loan applications (profitable projects obtain
loans). This idea has been explored in Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994).
• Signalling: Bank loans may signal the quality of the borrowing firm to stock
owners, buyers, suppliers and other creditors.3 A loan commitment from a
high-quality bank may provide a more favorable signal than a similar loan
commitment from low-quality banks. This is so because high-quality banks
provide a more thorough screening and monitoring of its borrowers. Further-
more, some banks have a reputation for being more risk averse than others.
Consequently, a loan commitment from a bank with a reputation for being
highly risk averse can signal that its borrowers have a low-probability of going
bankrupt. In this way, a bank loan can be used to alleviate the asymmetric
information problems a firm may face in negotiations with, for example, sup-
pliers and buyers. Signalling quality of a bank can for instance be negatively
associated with the extent to which the bank has suﬀered losses on its loan
portfolio.
• Bank solvency : Empirical literature has shown that borrowers may suﬀer if
their main bank is forced to restrict its lending capacity (see Slovin, Sushka,
and Polonchek (1993)). Consequently, a borrower may be concerned about
their main bank’s solvency or, more precisely, how likely it is that their bank
may face diﬃculties in providing loans in the future. Both a high capital ratio
and low loss provisions are variables that contribute to a bank’s solvency.
3The empirical study of Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) shows that loans from high-
quality lenders are associated with larger positive stock price reactions than loans from low-quality
lenders.
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• Size: Large banks tend to have a more extensive hierarchical structure than
small banks. Generally, Qian (1994) shows that this may weaken incentives
for workers in the lowest hierarchical tiers. Consequently, in large organization
workers are frequently guided by rules rather than a more flexible incentives
system. Along these lines, Cerasi and Daltung (1996) focus on how diver-
sification benefits in banking may be countervailed by losses due to weaker
incentives and more rule-based decision making in the lowest tiers in large
banks. Hence, some borrowers may prefer to use small and more flexible
banks whereas others may prefer large diversified banks.
Our very simple model structure is able to capture all these potentially important
bank characteristics.
In the first period borrowers are assumed to have access to an investment project
with present value, V (not including financing costs).
In the following analysis we take into account that there are many diﬀerent
qualities of a bank that borrowers may consider when they choose their main bank.
For simplicity, we denote borrower f ’s value of a bank relationship with a bank of
quality q (higher q means higher quality) as,
qRf
where Rf represents borrower f ’s appreciation of the bank’s quality. As an example;
a borrower which does not need additional funding in the future has a low Rf (pos-
sibly 0). In contrast, a borrower that is locked into a relationship with a particular
bank (high switching cost) and needs high quality service today as well as in the
future, would have a high Rf .4 Note that Rf cannot be observed by the bank and
hence a bank must charge the same interest rate to all of its borrowers. On the other
hand, banks may also diﬀer in many ways. A well capitalized bank will very unlikely
be forced to introduce credit restrictions. Furthermore, borrowers may expect that
banks that have suﬀered low losses in the past due to high-quality monitoring and
screening of loan applicants will be able to do skillful evaluation of new projects also
in the future. A loan from such a bank can also serve as a positive signal to other
4See for example Sharpe (1990) for a discussion of switching costs due to information asymme-
tries between lenders.
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stakeholders in the borrowing firm about the firm’s income prospects and its cred-
itworthiness. In the theory model, we do not allow the banks to diﬀerentiate along
many dimensions at the same time. However, our simple framework suﬃces to show
that heterogenous borrowers enable the banks to pursue diﬀerentiation strategies
and thereby reduce the level of competition.
We make three simplifying assumptions:
Assumption 1. Rf is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] .
Assumption 2. Total market demand is normalized to 1.
Assumption 3. Costs related to deviations from a banks’ cost minimizing quality
level, qo, are quadratic.
e(qi) = β (qi − qo)2 i = A,B
Note that the cost minimizing quality level, qo, can be interpreted as the quality
level that would have been chosen in the absence of strategic interactions among the
banks. Banks deviate from this level in order to soften the level of competition in
interest rates in period 2 (with identical banks, qo = qA = qB competition would be
fierce and there would be no profit).
To find the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in the two-stage game we start
with stage 2.
2.1. Competition at stage 2
First, let us examine the demand for loan given qA, qB, rA, and rB. Without loss of
generality assume qA ≥ qB, which implies that rA ≥ rB (otherwise bank B’s oﬀer
dominates bank A’s oﬀer). Borrower f compares the net benefits from using bank
A and bank B:5
Bank A: V − rA + qARf
5For simplicity we have assumed that the project has a certain outcome. However, we could
have assumed that there is a probability p < 1 for success. In case of failure the project is worthless.
Then, the expected value of the project would have been: p [V − ri + qiRi]. The choice between
the two banks would, however, not have changed.
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Bank B: V − rB + qBRf
A borrower of type bR, is indiﬀerent between using bank A and bank B.
V − rA + qA bR = V − rB + qB bRbR = rA − rB
qA − qB
Consequently, bank A and bank B face demand DA(rA, rB) and DB(rA, rB), respec-
tively
DA(rA, rB) = 1− bR
DB(rA, rB) = bR ,
and the banks’ stage-2 profit levels are
πA(rA, rB) = (rA − r0)DA(rA, rB)
πB(rA, rB) = (rB − r0)DB(rA, rB) , (2.1)
where r0 is the banks’ cost of funding. From the two banks’ profit maximizing choice
of interest rates, we get the Nash equilibrium at stage 2:
rA = (qA − qB)
2
3
+ r0
rB = (qA − qB)
1
3
+ r0 . (2.2)
From, equation (2.1) and (2.2) we have
πA(qA, qB) =
4
9
(qA − qB)
πB(qA, qB) =
1
9
(qA − qB) . (2.3)
Notice that there are two eﬀects from a change in a bank’s quality variable onto the
equilibrium interest rate charged. First, there is a direct eﬀect onto the demand for
loans. If bank quality improves, borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates.
Second, there is an indirect competition eﬀect onto the equilibrium interest rate
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charged. If Bank A (the high quality bank) improves its quality, the two competing
banks will become more diﬀerent and competition is softened. Hence, both banks are
able to charge higher interest rates (see equation (2.2)). On the other hand, if Bank
B (the low quality bank) improves its quality, the banks become less diﬀerentiated
and competition becomes more vigorous. In the simple model introduced above the
indirect competition eﬀect exceeds the strength of the direct eﬀect. In equilibrium,
quality improvement of the low quality bank induce both banks to charge lower
interest rates (see equation (2.2)). More identical banks compete more fiercely.
2.2. Competition at stage 1
At stage 1 the banks decide on their strategic variables (qA and qB) taking as given
the profit maximization behavior at stage 2.
Seen from stage 1 the banks’ profit maximization problems are:
Bank A: Max
qA
{πA(qA, qB)− e(qA)}
Bank B: Max
qB
{πB(qA, qB)− e(qB)}
From the first order conditions we get
q∗A = qo +
2
9
1
β
q∗B = qo −
1
18
1
β
Proposition 1 sums up our predictions from the theoretical model
Proposition 1.
i) If the banks become more diﬀerentiated, their interest rates and profitability
increase,
dri
d (q∗A − q∗B)
> 0, i = A,B,
dπi
d (q∗A − q∗B)
> 0, i = A,B, .
ii) The bank with the higher level of the strategic quality variable has the higher
stage-2 profit.
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Proof: i) The first part follows from (2.2), the second part and ii) from (2.3).
Proposition 1 ii) implies that both banks would prefer to be the high quality
bank but i) implies that both would loose if both become high quality banks (i.e.
qA − qB is small).6
3. Empirical model
In this section we present the empirical model that can facilitate a test of the pre-
diction of Proposition 1 i); as banks are more dispersed in terms of a certain bank
quality variable that borrowers appreciate and hence may be willing to pay for, com-
petition is softened and banks are able to charge borrowers higher interest rates.
More specifically, we want to analyze empirically what characteristics of a bank
borrowers are willing to pay for, and hence along what characteristics banks can
distinguish themselves from each other in order to soften competition.
The general structure of our empirical model is:
si,r,t = f(si,r,t−h, v (q)i,r,t−h, g (q)r,t−h,xi,t−h,fr,t−h, νi, ρr, τ t, ²i,r,t) , (3.1)
where si,r,t is the spread over the period t money market interest rate on loans from
bank i in market r in period t, and si,r,t−h a vector of its lagged values. v (q)i,r,t−h is
a vector representing the diﬀerence between the value of bank i’s quality variables
and the cross-sectional median of the corresponding bank quality variables in market
r in period t−h. h ∈ [0, T ] is the appropriate lag length for the various explanatory
variables. g (q)r,t−h is a vector containing for each bank quality variable a measure
of the inequality in that variable across banks in market r in period t− h. xi,t−h is
a vector of other bank and period specific variables that may influence the interest
rate spread si,r,t. fr,t−h is a vector of variables specific to market r in period t. νi
is a bank specific dummy taking care of bank specific eﬀects staying constant over
periods and markets. ρr is a dummy variable for the markets, taking care of market
specific eﬀects staying constant over time and bank. τ t is a dummy variable for
periods taking care of macro economic eﬀects staying constant across banks and
markets. Finally ²i,r,t is the error term.
6In this model as in all other models with ex ante symmetric agents and ex post asymmetric
profit levels, there is a potential coordination problem.
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The type of interest rates we consider are the interest rates banks charge on
credit lines to firms. Hence si,r,t is the spread of interest rates on credit lines over
the money market rate. Credit lines are usually considered as the most information
intensive type of loans, see Berger and Udell (1995).7 Thus, problems of lock-in and
high switching costs are likely to be more pronounced in markets for credit lines than
in other loan markets. Therefore the quality of a bank should be more important
for credit line customers than for other loan customers. We therefore apply and test
the hypothesis that credit line borrowers are willing to pay extra for borrowing from
a bank of high quality.
The theoretical model in section 2.1 predicts that the better a bank is compared
to its competitors in terms of a certain quality variable, the higher equilibrium
interest rate it charges. That is the motivation for specifying the variables depicted
in v (q)i,r,t−h as diﬀerences from the cross-sectional median of the corresponding
bank quality variables in the market in which bank i operates. Thus, these variables
represent, what is referred to as vertical diﬀerentiation. However, when more than
two banks are competing in the same market it is not just how much better or worse
bank i is, that matters for its competitive position, i.e. how much it is able to charge
its borrowers. The overall diﬀerentiation of all competitors in terms of the quality
variable will also matter. A larger dispersion will soften the overall competition in
the market and enable all banks to charge their borrowers a higher margin. That is
the motivation for including g (q)r,t−h that represents the cross-sectional inequality
or dispersion of the quality variables in each market. As will be shown below, we
measure these inequalities by Gini coeﬃcients.
Markets are defined by geography, and the country is divided into 18 regions, as
is explained in more details in subsection 3.1.
3.1. Data
We use a panel of Norwegian bank data covering the years 1993 to 1998. This is
the period immediately following the banking crisis in Norway. In the crisis three
of the four largest banks failed and were recapitalized by the government subject to
7Mester (1992) estimates a cost function based on information-theoretic considerations, realizing
the diﬀerent costs entailed in the provision of diﬀerent information-intensive outputs.
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trimming of the banks’ balances and operating costs. Smaller banks that failed were
acquired by sounder banks with the help of guarantees from the deposit insurance
funds. Only one small bank was forced to close. Thus, all other problem banks were
allowed to continue their operations but, as mentioned, on certain conditions. It can
therefore be assumed that in the years covered by our data both banks and their
borrowers had learnt about possible consequences of a bank running into solvency
problems.
The data are annual and include banks ranging from small local savings banks
to large nationwide banks. This large variety in the data ensures a relatively large
dispersion of various characteristics of the banks. The data consist both of balance
items, items from the banks’ result accounting, and average interest rates by the
end of the year on some specific loan aggregates. The number of banks in the
sample used varies between a maximum of 121 in 1998 and a minimum of 108 in
1994.8 Norway is divided into 19 counties. Loans outstanding for each bank are also
reported by county.
Markets are defined by geography, and the country is divided into 19 counties.
We define each county as one market. The capital Oslo, which itself is a county, and
the county surrounding it, Akershus, are defined as one market, leaving us with a
total of 18 markets. The majority of Norwegian banks only operate in one or two
counties. Only the three largest banks are represented in all of the 18 loan markets
defined here in the whole period covered. The fourth largest bank is represented in
all 18 markets in three of six years.9
As the data on interest rates charged by the banks are not specified by county we
have to maintain the hypothesis that there is no systematic variation in the interest
rates on credit lines across counties, thus any variation is random and is captured by
the error term of the model. However, we have data on total loans by all banks by
county, that allows us to define which banks operate in what county. Characteristics
8Only banks reporting the necessary data are included in the sample.
9In cases where a bank has less than 0.1 pct. of the loan market in a county, it is considered not
represented in that county, and that particular combination of bank and county is not included in
the data set. If this was not done, small banks, having a few borrowers that physically have moved
to another county and maintained their loans in the original bank, would have been considered as
actively competing for loans in that county. This also implies that a few very small banks are not
included in the sample nor as competing banks to those in the sample.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Spread 4.74 1.32 0.19 10.14
Assets 30.415 45.480 0.120 161.485
Credit line loans 2.848 4.632 0.005 19.361
Loans 25.618 37.402 0.102 123.834
Capital ratio pct. 15.96 6.04 6.99 46.33
Loss provisions pct. 3.70 2.78 0.07 14.19
Operating cost ratio 2.78 0.54 1.28 5.96
Operating costs 724.3 1062.8 3.5 3599.7
Herfindahl index 1963 615 1138 3987
Spread is the diﬀerence between interest rates on credit line loans and the
3 months money market interest rate, in pct. Assets, credit line loans and
loans are measured in NOK billions, 1 NOK ≈ 0.125 EUR. Operating costs is
measured in NOK millions. Capital ratio is measured according to the Basel
1988 Accord. Loss proviosions are the stock of accumulated loss provisions
relative the stock of loans outstanding. Operating cost ratio is operating
costs relative to loans outstanding. The Herfindahl index is measured by each
county and year, wheres all other variables in the table are measured by bank
and year.
of the banks other than loans are not specified by county. However, most of the
characteristics of a banking firm that matter to the borrowers (its solvency, capital
ratio, overall size, its overall ability to screen and monitor etc.) would be constant
across counties. Hence for our purpose this can not be considered a severe limitation
of the data.
A summary of the data used in the estimation is presented in table 3.1
3.2. Specification of the empirical model
We estimate the following log-linear version of 3.1:10
si,t = α1si,t−1+α2si,t−2+v (q)i,r,t−hβ+g (q)r,t−hγ + xi,r,t−hδ + f r,t−hµ+νi+ρr+τ t+²i,r,t
(3.2)
where h ∈ [0, 1].
10A linear version of the same model did not pass the RESET test for functional form.
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Since we do not know the identity of the borrowers at each bank, we are not
able to directly control for the element of si,t that is due to borrower specific risk.
However, it is well known from other empirical work that the composition of a
bank’s borrowers only changes slowly over time (see for instance Ongena and Smith
(1998), Degryse and van Cayseele (2000) and Kim, Kliger, and Vale (1999)). Hence
in the absence of borrower specific information, borrower specific risk can partially
be controlled for by the bank dummies and partially by the lagged values of si,t.
Furthermore, the macroeconomic part of borrower risk is controlled for by the time
dummies and the regional specific part by the regional dummies.
We specify a log-linear version of 3.2 with the following RHS variables:
Variable Description
si,t−1, si,t−2 Lags of the spread of interest rate on credit lines
Bank quality v (q)i,r,t−h:
v(assets)i,r,t−1 Total assets of bank i end of year t− 1
v(cap88)i,r,t−1 Capital ratio(Basel 88) of bank i end of year t− 1
v(loss)i,r,t−1 Ratio of accumulated loss provisions to loans outstanding
for bank i end of year t− 1
Gini coeﬃcients of quality g (q)r,t−h:
g(assets)r,t−1
g(cap88)r,t−1
g(loss)r,t−1
Controls (xi,t; fr,t; dummies):
costrati,t Ratio of materials- and wage cost to loans outstanding
for bank i in year t
herfinr,t Herfindahl index of the bank to business credit market
in county r in year t
νi, ρr, τ t Bank, county and year dummies
v(q)i,r,t−1 is a vector representing the diﬀerence between the value of bank i’s quality
variables and the cross-sectional median of the corresponding bank quality variables in
market r in period t− 1. g(q)r,t−1 is a vector containing for each bank quality variable a
measure of the inequality in that variable across banks in market r in period t− 1.
All lagged stock variables are aggregated backwards, i.e. the bank structure of year t is
forced upon the variable in year t− 1.
The variables listed under the heading ‘bank quality variables’ are variables that
borrowers are likely to take into account as signals by banks when choosing a bank.
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The operator v represents the cross-sectional diﬀerence of a quality variable q in the
following way:
v(q)i,r,t = qi,t −median
i∈r
(qi,t) .
i ∈ r states that median is calculated only over banks operating in county r. Note
that even if qi,t only varies across banks and years, v(q)i,r,t will also vary across
counties.
The Gini coeﬃcients are calculated as:
g(q)r,t = 1 +
1
nr
− 2
n2rqr,t
X
i∈r
j · qi,t
where qr,t =
1
nr
X
i∈r
qi,t , j = 1, 2, 3, · · · , nr ,
nr is the number of banks operating in county r, and j is a rank number assigned
to each qi,t in decreasing order of size.
assets represents the size of a bank. The larger the bank the more diversified
its portfolio is likely to be, and cet. par. the less likely it is that the bank will suﬀer
huge losses and be forced to reduce its lending activity. Furthermore, a larger bank
is also more likely to be considered as “too big to fail” by the government. On
the other hand large banks may face more severe principal/agent problems in their
organization than small banks do, and thus perform monitoring and screening of less
quality than smaller banks. One way to reduce these agency costs is for a large bank
to adhere to rules rather than discretion, which for the borrowers may result in more
rigid loan conditions. Borrowers who value tight monitoring and screening highly
and for whom more flexible loan conditions are important, may hence be willing to
pay more for services oﬀered by a smaller bank. For borrowers willing to accept
lower quality of monitoring and screening functions or more rigid loan conditions,
the opposite may hold. Hence the expected impact of v(assets)i,r,t−1 on the banks’
spread is ambiguous. C.f. discussion in section 2.
cap88 represents the solvency of a bank in terms of its ability to withstand large
loan losses without being forced to cut its lending in order to satisfy the capital
requirements. This variable can have a positive impact on the spread, as borrowers
may be willing to pay for this sign of quality. A positive sign can also indicate
that banks under imperfect competition are able to pass on to borrowers the higher
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total costs of finance incurred by a higher capital ratio. However, diﬀerent degrees
of risk aversion among banks can be reflected in a negative sign of v(cap88)i,r,t−1
in this reduced form model. Banks with high degree of risk aversion are expected
to operate both with a high capital ratio — to minimize the possibility of moving
below the minimum requirement — and at the same time lend to safe borrowers,
borrowers from which they only can charge a low interest rate spread. The other
extreme of this story would be a bank very close to or even below the minimum
capital requirement that behaves like a risk lover or ‘gambles for resurrection’ by
lending to high risk borrowers from which it can charge a high interest rate spread.
Thus, the expected sign of the coeﬃcient v(cap88)i,r,t−1 is indeterminate.
loss as a quality variable represents the results of the bank’s ability to screen and
monitor, as well as borrowers’ need to signal their low riskiness to other creditors
and to their customers, by borrowing from a bank that has suﬀered few loan losses
(c.f. the discussion in the two first bullet points of section 2). Low loss provisions
will also increase the probability that the bank can maintain its solvency and hence
its lending capacity in the future. To the extent borrowers are willing to pay for
this quality variable, the expected impact of v(loss)i,r,t−1 on the spread is negative.
The expected sign of the estimated parameters for all the Gini coeﬃcients are
positive. More dispersion among banks in terms of variables borrowers care about,
serves to soften competition and hence increase the interest rate banks can charge
their borrowers. Recall that a key assumption — and a fairly realistic one — in this
paper is the heterogeneity of borrower preferences. If one of the Gini coeﬃcients
of an underlying variable turns out to be insignificantly diﬀerent from zero, this
indicates that more dispersion among competing banks along this variable does not
soften competition. Under our heterogeneity assumption this also implies that the
underlying variable is not a quality variable as defined in section 2.
We use a lag of one year for all the quality variables. Borrowers have to base
their evaluation of the bank on the values published in the bank’s annual report and
financial statements for the last year. These are usually more comprehensive and
more scrupulously audited statements than the quarterly statements made during
the year.
Among the control variables, costrati,t represents the banks’ ability under im-
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perfect competition to pass their operating costs on to their credit line borrowers.
The regional Herfindahl index herfinr,t controls for the competitive environ-
ment, as measured by market concentration, in which a bank operates. The more
concentrated the market is the higher is the value of the Herfindahl index. A more
concentrated market is usually considered a less competitive market, and banks
should be able to charge a higher interest rate. Hence the expected sign of this
variable should be positive. However, it could also have a negative sign due to the
‘winner’s curse’ problem discussed in auction theory.11
The dummies control for bank, regional, and time specific eﬀects.12
4. Empirical results
The model in 3.2 is estimated using two-stage least square. costrati,t is endogenous,
it may be partially determined by the LHS variable si,t. It is therefore instrumented
using its own one year lag, not aggregated backwards.13 The correlation between
ln costrati,t and its lag is 0.90.
We start by estimating the general model including all the RHS variables listed
in section 3.2, The results are presented in Table 4.1 column (a), and indicate a
model that satisfies certain misspecification tests regarding lack of serial correlation
in the residuals and no functional form misspecification.
We find no evidence of size as a quality variable as both ln v(assets)i,r,t−1 and the
corresponding Gini coeﬃcient are insignificant. The insignificance of the Gini coef-
ficient of the capital ratio indicates that the capital ratio is not a strategic variable
as defined in section 2. The Herfindahl index is insignificant as well. Furthermore,
all county dummies are insignificant. Exclusion of all these variables is statistically
valid, as is shown by the reported F -test. Thus, we get the parsimonious model (b)
which also passes the tests for functional form and for no serial correlation in the
11See for instance Bulow and Klemperer (1999) who construct a theory model of auctions where
a reduction in the number of bidders actually raises the price when bidders are asymmetric.
12In a previous version of the model, instead of using dummies we controlled for borrower risk
using the loan loss ratio on credit line loans and a macro variable, the real interest rate. Our
main qualitative results were equivalent to those of the model presented in this paper. This model,
however, performs better in terms misspecification tests than the previous version.
13Backward aggregation of a variable means that the bank structure of year t is forced upon the
variable in year t− 1.
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Table 4.1: Empirical results
LHS variable ln si,t
(credit line interest rate spread over money market interest rate)
Variable (a) (b)
ln si,t−1 0.0296
(0.89)
0.0252
(0.76)
ln si,t−2 0.0230
(1.11)
0.0174
(0.85)
Bank quality v (q)i,r,t−1:
ln v(assets)i,r,t−1 0.0278
(1.31)
—
ln v(cap88)i,r,t−1 −0.1389
(−3.19)
−0.1562
(−4.37)
ln v(loss)i,r,t−1 −0.1458
(−5.68)
−0.1193
(−6.23)
Gini coeﬃcients of quality g (q)r,t−1:
ln g(assets)r,t−1 −0.0266
(−0.09)
—
ln g(cap88)r,t−1 −0.061
(−0.97)
—
ln g(loss)r,t−1 0.1552
(3.16)
0.1528
(3.91)
Controls (xi,t; fr,t; dummies):
ln costrati,t 0.8217
(3.52)
0.7880
(3.43)
lnherfinr,t 0.0396
(0.54)
—
υi in in
ρr in —
τ t in in
F -test, (a) — (b) — 0.81
AR(1,2) 0.19 0.62
RESET 0.91 0.94
R2 adj. 0.4804 0.4869
Number of observations is 1241. v(q)i,r,t−1 is a vector representing the diﬀerence
between the value of bank i’s quality variables and the cross-sectional median of the
corresponding bank quality variables in market r in period t− 1. g(q)r,t−1 is a vector
containing for each bank quality variable a measure of the Gini coeﬃcient of that
variable across banks in market r in period t− 1. Numbers in parantheses are White
heteroscedasticity consistent t-values. The F -test is a test of the joint significance
of the variables excluded from model (a), the p-value is reported. AR(1,2) is a joint
Preusch-Pagan test for first and second order serial correlation in the residuals. P-
values for the F -test are reported (see Greene (1993) p. 428). RESET is the test for
functional form using the square of the predicted value as RHS. P-values of the t-test
is reported.
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residuals. Note that due to the log-linear specification all coeﬃcients of the model
can be interpreted as elasticities.
The negative and significant coeﬃcient of ln v(loss)i,r,t−1 and the positive and
significant coeﬃcient of the corresponding ln g(loss)r,t−1 supports the hypothesis
that banks can segment the markets according to borrowers’ willingness to pay for
borrowing from banks with low losses (c.f. the two first bullet points in section 2).
Borrowers’ appreciation of banks with low loss provisions serves as an important
disciplinary device, inducing banks to avoid losses. To illustrate the strength of this
disciplinary eﬀect, consider a bank at sample mean with an interest rate spread on
its credit line loans of 4.74 pct. It will according to our results be ‘punished’ by a
reduction of the interest rate spread in the range of 0.38 to 0.74 pct. points, if its
loss provisions relative to its competitors double.14 Thus, there may be a market
discipline eﬀect at work not only in the money market, but also in the market for
credit line loans. Both banks’ lenders and borrowers punish banks with high loan
losses.
The negative sign for ln v(cap88)i,r,t−1 supports the claim that banks with high
risk aversion tend to both have high capital ratio and lend to safe borrowers implying
a low interest rate spread.
Among the control variables note that the elasticity of the costrati,t is positive
and significant. Thus, banks operating under imperfect competition in the market
for credit line loans are able to pass some of their operating costs over to these
borrowers. The estimated elasticity implies that a bank at sample mean, with NOK
mill. 724 in operating costs and credit line loans of NOK mill. 2848, facing a ten
pct. increase in its operating costs would be able to pass approximately NOK mill.
11 of the cost increase of NOK mill. 72 onto its credit line borrowers.
As the Herfindahl index does not obtain a significant coeﬃcient we can neither
give support to the traditional view of more concentrated credit markets leading to
higher interest rates nor to the theories of ‘winner’s curse’.
Our results seem to indicate that borrowers care more about the signalling eﬀect
from bank loans than they care about the solvency of the bank at which they borrow.
A loan from a low-loss bank provides a positive signal to the other stakeholders of
14This range is calculated as a 95 pct. confidence interval.
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the borrowing firm. One alternative interpretation of borrowers’ appreciation of
low loan losses is that borrowers care about the solvency of the banks and hence
the future of their bank relationship. Had the solvency of banks been of major
concern to borrowers, we would expect to see positive and significant signs both of
ln v(cap88)i,r,t−1 and its Gini coeﬃcient. Since this is not the case, we are left with
the signalling interpretation of the significance of the loan loss provisions.
The empirical results that borrowers facing high switching costs do not seem to
care about the future lending capacity of their bank, may be associated with the way
the banking crisis in the early nineties was handled by the Norwegian government.
All banks — with one minor exception — were recapitalized such that lending activities
could continue.15 This may explain why borrowers are not concerned with bank
solvency.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied strategies pursued by banks to diﬀerentiate their
services from those of their rivals and thereby soften competition. More specifically
we have analyzed if the bank size, a bank’s ability to avoiding losses, and its capital
ratio can be used as such strategic variables. We also study to what extent borrowers
are willing to pay for high quality along these dimensions. Using a panel of data
covering Norwegian banks between 1993 and 1998 we found empirical support for
the banks’ ability to avoid losses, measured by the ratio of loss provisions, as such a
strategic variable. This implies that borrowers in the market for credit line loans may
discipline banks to avoid future losses. Borrowers’ appreciation of low-loss banks is
interpreted as evidence that loans from such banks provide a positive signal. We
also found evidence that banks pass on parts of increases in their operating costs to
credit line borrowers. However, we did not find evidence for the use of high capital-
ratio as a strategic variable that borrowers are willing to pay for. This finding may
be explained by the way the banking crisis in the early nineties was handled.
15In fact Ongena, Smith, and Michalsen (2000) find that firms listed on Oslo Stock Exchange
that maintained a banking relationship with any of the problem banks during the announcements
of the banks’ distress events, on average only had small and temporary negative excess returns
around the distress announcement dates. Furthermore, Vale (2001) finds evidence that small firms
borrowing from problem banks were not aﬀected negatively due to their bank relations.
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